The Effect of Financial Leverage on Profitability and Risk of Restaurant Firms by Yoon, Eunju & Jang, SooCheong
Journal of Hospitality Financial Management
The Professional Refereed Journal of the International Association of Hospitality
Financial Management Educators
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 24
2005
The Effect of Financial Leverage on Profitability
and Risk of Restaurant Firms
Eunju Yoon
SooCheong Jang
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm
This Refereed Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Hospitality Financial Management by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yoon, Eunju and Jang, SooCheong (2005) "The Effect of Financial Leverage on Profitability and Risk of Restaurant Firms ," Journal of
Hospitality Financial Management: Vol. 13 : Iss. 1 , Article 24.
Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm/vol13/iss1/24
  
THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL LEVERAGE ON PROFITABILITY AND RISK OF 
RESTAURANT FIRMS 
 
Eunju Yoon  
and  
SooCheong Jang 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study presents an empirical insight into the relationship between return on equity (ROE), 
financial leverage and size of firms in the restaurant industry for the period 1998 to 2003 using 
OLS regressions. Research results suggest that at least during the test period firm size had a more 
dominant effect on ROE of restaurant firms than debt use, larger firms earning significantly 
higher equity returns. Results also suggest that regardless of having lower financial leverage, 
smaller restaurant firms were significantly more risky than larger firms.  
As such, the dominance of size effect in the ROE-financial leverage relationship within the 
restaurant industry is better understood. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been reported that many new restaurants start up but one of three new restaurants in 
the United States fails within 2 years (Ernst, 2002). According to Ernst (2002), the lack of a 
financial plan is one of the most common reasons for restaurant business failure, following 
choosing the wrong location. Financial planning is an important part in the restaurant business 
because the restaurant industry has higher percentage of cost of sale than other industries. A 
national survey in 2000 evidenced that 61 cents was consumed as food and labor costs for every 
dollar earned in full-service hotel restaurants, excluding other costs such as interest expense and 
rent (Ernst, 2002). Because of the high-cost nature of the business, the profitability of restaurant 
firms may be related to the level of interest expenses that are incurred due to the firms’ debt use.    
According to previous studies, financial leverage affects cost of capital, ultimately 
influencing firms’ profitability and stock prices (Higgins, 1977; Miller, 1977; Myers, 1984; 
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Sheel, 1994). Also, several researchers have studied firms’ debt use and suggested the 
determinants of financial leverage by reporting that firm’s debt-equity decision is generally 
based on a trade-off between interest tax shields and the costs of financial stress (Kim, 1997; 
Sheel, 1994; Sunder & Myers, 1999; Titman & Wessles, 1988; Upneja & Dalbor, 2001). 
According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, the optimal debt level balances the benefits 
of debt against the costs of debt (Gu, 1993). The tax benefits of debt dominate up to a certain 
debt ratio, resulting in higher return on equity, but the benefit would be less than the cost after 
the level of debt ratio. In other words, the more a company uses debt, the less income tax the 
company pays, but the greater its financial risk. Elgonemy (2002) mentioned that hotel investors 
must consider four basic elements debt-financing: business risk, the need for financial flexibility, 
the degree of ownerships’ risk aversion, and tax considerations. Based on the trade-off theory for 
capital structure, firms can take advantage of debt to make a better return on equity. Since 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) investigated a balancing theory of optimal capital structure 
between the tax advantages of debt and the cost of debt to maximize the value of firms, many 
subsequent studies have attempted to find the determinants of capital structures in the hospitality 
industry (Upneja & Dalbor, 2001; Kim, 1997; Sheel, 1994). Despite the importance of capital 
structure, there are few studies, particularly in the restaurant industry, on the relationship 
between internal performance measures based on the firm’s financial statements and external 
appraisal based on stock price changes. The main objective of this study was to investigate the 
effect of financial leverage on restaurant firms’ profitability and risk. Since the aim of this study 
was not to discover the determinants of profitability and risk in restaurant firms but to examine 
whether financial leverage is significantly related to firm’s performance and risk, only one 
predicting variable, financial leverage, was used in regression analyses along with one control 
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variable, the firms’ total assets. Total asset of the restaurant companies was used as a proxy of 
the firm size (Kim 1997, Sheel 1994). Both accounting-based measures and market-based 
measures were examined to see whether these two different types of measures held the same 
information on the level of debt use and to provide practical information to both managers and 
investors in restaurant companies.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been several capital structure studies conducted in the hospitality industry. 
Sheel (1994) was one of the pioneers, reporting that collateral value of assets would be the most 
significant determinant of long-term debt in his research on hotel and manufacturing firms. Kim 
(1997) investigated the determinants of restaurant capital structure. In the study, seven variables 
(size, earning volatility, profitability, growth opportunities, non-debt tax-shield, percentage of 
franchise, and lease expense) were regressed against short-term, long-term and total debt of 
restaurant firms. The significant determinants for long-term debt were firm size, growth 
opportunities, and lease expenses. All three predictors were negative. In other words, smaller 
restaurant firms having fewer growth opportunities and spending less on leases were more likely 
to use long-term debt (Kim, 1997). Using a pooled regression analysis, Dalber and Upneja (2002) 
summarized theories related to debt maturity and debt selection (contracting costs of debt, 
signaling effects, and tax effects). Firms with growth opportunities should need less long-term 
debt because they make more discretionary investments and they are not willing to pay the 
relatively high fixed costs of high interest payments. Long-term debt tends to send the wrong 
signal about a firm’s market value; low-quality firms may take advantage of mispricing because 
investors are not able to distinguish them from high-quality firms. In terms of tax effects, a firm 
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with a higher tax rate tends to use more long-term and more risky debt. Tax rates also can be 
used as a proxy for the firm’s financial stress or distress. In empirically testing these theories, 
results showed that larger restaurant firms with low growth opportunities and with a higher 
probability of bankruptcy use more long-term debt because they don’t want benefits to accrue to 
bondholders, they can afford the higher fixed costs of long-term debt, and they are willing to take 
advantage of mispricing. Moreover, riskier restaurant firms tend to use more long-term debt 
(Dalber & Upneja, 2002). 
Most studies of capital structure used a basic assumption of the trade-off theory. Once 
firms find a certain optimal combination of financing sources, that is, the mix of debt and equity 
sources that balance the benefits of the tax shield provided by debt with the increased costs of 
financial distress to the firm’s equity holders, firms should maintain this target capital structure. 
However, two empirical studies indicated that this is not valid. Although the two studies 
surveyed different samples, the interpretation of the results was similar. Pinegar and Wilbricht 
(1989) surveyed Fortune 500 firms, only 31 % of the firms reported that they used target capital 
structure. Hittle, Haddad, and Gitman (1992) surveyed the 500 largest Over-The-Counter firms 
and found that only 11 % of the surveyed firms used target capital structure. Furthermore, when 
both taxes for corporate and equity holders were considered at the same time, financial leverage 
appeared not to bring significant benefits to the investors at the end (Myers, 2001). Although this 
is difficult to explain under the agency cost/tax shield trade-off theory, Sunder and Myers (1999) 
explained that the most profitable firms in many industries often have the lowest debt ratio, 
which is very different from predictions using the trade-off theory. Dann (1981) and James (1987) 
also noted that large positive abnormal returns for a firm’s stockholders are associated with 
leverage increasing events such as stock repurchases or debt-for-equity exchanges instead of 
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leverage-decreasing events such as issuing stock. Few American companies issue new stock as 
frequently as once per decade (Megginson, 1997). In contrast to the trade-off theory, the pecking 
order theory of capital structure states that firms have a preferred hierarchy for financing 
decisions. The highest preference is to use internal financing such as retained earning, before 
resorting to any form of external funding. If a firm uses external funding, the order of preference 
is debt, convertible securities, preferred stock, and common stock (Myers, 1984). This order 
reflects the motivation of a financial manager to reduce the agency costs of equity, retain control 
of the firm, and avoid the seemingly inevitable negative market reaction to an announcement of a 
new equity issue (Hawawini & Viallet, 1999). However, the pecking order theory also has some 
limitations. It does not explain the influence of taxes, financial distress, security issuance costs, 
or the set of investment opportunities available to a firm in that firm’s actual capital structure. In 
reality, it is impossible to explain real situations with one or two theories.  
Titman and Wessels (1988) observed that highly profitable firms have lower levels of 
leverage than less profitable firms because they first use their earnings before seeking outside 
capital. In addition, stock prices reflect how the firm performs. Firms tend to issue equity rather 
than use debt when their stock price increases, so that their leverage levels stay lower than firms 
using debt. Similar findings were reported more recently in Gu (1993), Sheel (1994), Sunder & 
Myers (1999) and Wald (1999). According to Wald (1999), profitability, which is the most 
significant determinant of firms’ financial leverage, negatively affects the debt to asset ratios in 
the heteroskedastic tobit regression model. Sheel (1994) also supported the negative relationship 
between debt-to-asset ratio and non-debt tax shield or/and between firm’s leverage behavior and 
its past profitability. Specific to the restaurant industry, Gu (1993) found that the fine dining 
restaurant segment, which uses debt lightly compared to the fast-food restaurant and the 
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economy/family restaurant segments, has the highest percentage of profit margin and of return 
on assets. The research concluded that medium debt use may not be the optimal capital structure 
but little or no debt use may be optimal. Because of the characteristics of the food service 
industry, such as its vulnerability to seasonality and economic adversity, using debt could bring 
greater risk than for those firms in industries where cost of debt may be lower than restaurant 
industry (Gu, 1993).  
 
HYPOTHESES 
In order to achieve the objective of this study, which was to investigate the association 
between financial leverage and restaurant firms’ profitability and risk, three hypotheses were 
developed. Both accounting-based measures and market-based measures were examined to see 
whether these two different types of measures held same information on the level of debt use and 
to provide practical information to both managers of and investors in restaurant companies.  
Despite the conflict with the general expectation, based on the findings of Gu (1993), 
profitability should be higher for firms using less or no debt than those using more debt in the 
restaurant industry. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was proposed: restaurant firms using a lower level of 
financial leverage have higher profitability. 
When a restaurant has a higher level of financial leverage, it should spend a large interest 
expense regardless of business situations. Thus, profitability of the restaurant would be volatile if 
business environments change. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was: restaurant firms with a higher level of 
financial leverage are riskier than those with a lower level of financial leverage.  
Both accounting measures and market measures are expected to result in similar 
outcomes regarding the effect of financial leverage on restaurant firms’ profitability and risk, 
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because both measures are basically rooted in a company’s financial performance. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 was: market-based measures and accounting-based measures are positively 
correlated to each other. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 5812 (eating and drinking places) was used to 
represent the restaurant industry in this study. Financial statements and stock prices of sixty-two 
restaurant firms in the United States for the years 1998 through 2003 were collected from the 
Mergent Online database and the Yahoo Finance. Thus, the total observation (company-year) 
was 372. The restaurant firms used for the analysis are listed in the Appendix A.  
Financial leverage (FL) was measured with long-term debt (LTD) to total asset (TA). 
Long-term debt in this study was defined as any debt that has maturity of more than one year. 
FL = LTD / TA,  
where FL = financial leverage, LTD = long-term debt, and TA = Total Asset. 
Accounting-based profitability was measured using return on equity (ROE) ratio. ROE is 
a comprehensive indicator of a firm’s performance because it provides information as to how 
well managers are using the funds invested by the firms’ shareholders to generate returns. 
Market based profitability was assessed using changes in stock price (SP).  
ROE = NI / ET 
SP = [(Pr
 t - Pr t-1) / Pr t-1] *100,  
where ROE = return on equity, NI = net income (after tax) for the year, ET = equity for 
the year, SP = stock price change in percentage, Pr
 t = stock price of the month, and Pr t-1 = stock 
price of the previous month. 
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Standard deviation among quarterly ROE for a year was used as the risk associated with 
accounting-based measures while standard deviation of monthly stock price changes was 
calculated for market-based risk measures. There are several different ways of estimating risk. 
Dalbor and Upneja (2002) used Ohlson’s revised O score indicating the probability of 
bankruptcy and Skalpe (2002) used percentage change in return on investment (ROA) as their 
accounting-based risk measure while many other researchers used standard deviation or variance 
of profitability measures. For example, Sheel (1994) estimated the accounting-based risk using 
standard deviation of profit and Kim (1997) using standard deviation of EBIT, and Borde (1998) 
estimated market risk using stock-return variance and Gu (1994) using standard deviation of 
monthly return on stock. Because this study investigated both accounting and market measures, 
standard deviations of profitability measures were used as risk.    
It was impossible to calculate ROEs of some companies because of missing data for 
several periods. As a result, the total ROE observations were 340. When a company has net loss, 
rather than net income, ROE was negative. Fifty-four had negative ROEs. Twelve among these 
54 ROEs were from 2002 and twelve from 1999. In 2001, however, only five negative ROEs 
were detected, which was the smallest number of observations in the six-year study period. In 
fact, overall sales of the foodservice industry grew after the terrorist attack in 2001 (Peters, 2002). 
Especially, revenues of 46 publicly traded casual-dining chain sector increased averaging 11.5 
percent for the first seven months of 2002 when compared to the same period in 2001. Therefore, 
it was presumed that 54 negative ROEs were derived from the restaurant firms which were other 
than casual-dining chains or which depended their sales largely on the travelers rather than local 
customers.  
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One hundred forty-two negative percentage changes in stock price were found among 
363 observations. Approximately, two thirds of these negative numbers were from 1998 to 2000 
(65.5 %). Less than 10 % of the 142 negative values were from 2001 (9.2%). In 2002, twenty-
seven companies’ stock prices decreased. To satisfy basic assumptions for the regression 
analysis, the variables were checked for normality and linearity between dependent and 
independent variables, and were then transformed. The note of Table 1 shows the transformation 
functions that were used for the subsequent analysis.  
 
(Insert Table 1 About Here) 
 
Four regression analyses, having financial leverage (FL) as an independent variable and 
total assets (TA) as a control variable, were performed for each profitability and risk measure to 
test the proposed hypotheses. SPSS 11.5 was used to statistical tests performed in this study. The 
four regression models can be expressed as follows: 
ROE = β0 + β1FL + β2TA + ε 
SP = β0 + β1FL + β2TA + ε 
Standard deviation of ROE = β0 + β1FL + β2TA + ε 
Standard deviation of SP = β0 + β1FL + β2TA + ε 
In addition to these four regression analyses, correlations among each measure were 
examined to test hypothesis three. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of the regression analysis related to hypothesis one (restaurant firms using a 
lower level of financial leverage have higher profitability) are presented in Table 2. 
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Multicollinearity was checked with Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), and no evidence of a 
multicollinearity problem was found in the model. When the significance level was set at α = 
0.05, the model for the accounting-based profitability ratio, which was measured by ROE in this 
study, was significant (F-statistics= 14.219, p-value = 0.000, variance explained = 8.3%) while 
one for the market-based profitability measure, which was determined by stock price change in 
percentage, was not significant (F-statistics = 2.526, p-value = 0.082, variance explained = 0.9%). 
However, ROE was mostly predicted by the control variable, total assets (t-test = 5.154, p-value 
= 0.000), rather than the expected predictor, financial leverage (t-test = 1.301, p-value = 0.194). 
This result suggests that the restaurant firms with larger assets were more profitable. But the 
above findings indicate that financial leverage does not influence the restaurant firms’ 
profitability, not supporting the hypothesis one. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the sign 
of financial leverage is positive; meaning that more leveraged firms had more profits on average 
even though it was not statistically significant. This is somewhat consistent with the findings of 
Upneja and Dalbor (2001). Their study reported that publicly traded restaurant firms with high 
cash flows tend to use more debt. The researchers explained the reason as opportunities for 
growth. Based on their explanation, a firm that is able to generate more cash has greater 
opportunity for growth. Furthermore, it will be easier for them to borrow money from creditors 
than for those with less profitable restaurant firms.   
However, the models in this study were not strong enough to examine the relationship 
between financial leverage and profitability because the models explained only 8.3 % of the 
variance for accounting-based profitability and 0.9 % for market-based profitability. Inclusion of 
more control variables, such as tax rates, growth opportunities, and probability of bankruptcy 
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might suppress nuisance more effectively to better identify the relationship between financial 
leverage and profitability. Future study is recommended to include more control variables.  
 
(Insert Table 2 About Here) 
 
The regression results for hypothesis two are shown in Table 3. There was no collinearity 
problem between FL (VIF = 1.001) and TA (VIF = 1.001).  Both accounting-based and market-
based risk measures turned out to be significant when alpha was set at 0.05. As shown in Table 3, 
volatility in ROE could be predicted by financial leverage in the presence of total assets in the 
model (F-statistics = 28.738, p-value = 0.000, variance explained = 16.2%). Investor risk was 
also predictable using a firm’s leverage level (F-statistics = 31.212, p-value = 0.000, variance 
explained = 15.7%).   
 
(Insert Table 3 About Here) 
 
The results for the second hypothesis seems not to be rational since the sign of the betas 
were opposite to our expectation. Financial leverage had a significant negative sign at an alpha 
level of 0.05 for both models. In other words, a firm with a higher level of financial leverage had 
less volatility in its ROE, and stock prices changed in a narrower range than for firms with less 
financial leverage. One possible explanation may be related to the result of the first hypothesis. It 
was observed that the sign of financial leverage was positive, which means that firms with higher 
debt rates were, on average, more profitable. It is logical that more profitable firms are less risky 
in business, so that they could have less volatile in accounting and market measures. Thus, the 
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restaurant business with higher debt rate was turned out to be less volatile in the analysis. This is 
a unique finding from this study about the restaurant industry. This result is also supported by the 
correlation analyses for the hypothesis three. Table 4 presents the results of the correlation 
analyses. ROE and the standard deviation of ROE were negatively correlated (R = -.16, p-value 
= .01) and ROE and the standard deviation of SP had negative correlation as well (R = -.22, p-
value = .00), which implies that restaurant firms with high returns on equity have less volatility 
in their ROE and SP. Another explanation may be found on Sheel’s study (1994). Relative to the 
manufacturing industry, in the hotel industry, a volatility of earnings on the long-term debt levels 
had significantly larger negative influence. The reduction in debt level leads to smaller total 
capitalization. However, the hotel industry has higher levels of operating leverage as well as 
financial leverage than the manufacturing industry. Therefore, cutting down the level of debt will 
result in an increase in earning volatility (Sheel, 1994). The hotel industry and the restaurant 
industry could be presumed to have a lot in common. However, to verify these possible reasons, 
further investigation is necessary.   
    Table 4 shows the results of the correlation analysis among the variables. Financial 
leverage was not significantly related to the profitability variables. The correlation between 
financial leverage and volatility on ROE (R=-.30, p-value = .00) and between financial leverage 
and volatility on stock price change (R = -.11, p-value = .05) were significant. Total assets were 
significantly related to the accounting-based profitability measure (R = .24, p = .00), accounting-
based risk measure (R = -.28, p-value = .00), and market-based risk measure (R = -.41, p-value 
= .00). Volatility of ROE was statistically significantly correlated to all other variables used in 
this study. This accounting-based risk measure was negatively correlated to the two profit 
proxies, ROE (R = -.16, p-value = .01) and SP (R = -.13, p-value = .02), and two exploratory 
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variables, FL (R = -.30, p-value = .00) and TA  (R = -.28, p-value = .00). In connection with 
hypothesis three, both profitability measures (R = .14, p-value = .01) and risk measures (R = .25, 
p-value = .00) were positively correlated to each other. This result indicates that the accounting-
based profitability measure and risk measure are projected correctly to those in market-based 
measures. However, correlation coefficients were not very high, so the results need to be 
validated in the future studies as well.  
 
(Insert Table 4 About Here) 
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
This study investigated the relationship between financial leverage and profitability and 
risk. Accounting-based profit and risk measures and market-based profit and risk measures were 
examined. It was hypothesized that highly leveraged restaurant firms have lower profitability. 
However, this research failed to support the hypothesized positive relationship between financial 
leverage and both profit measures. It was also hypothesized that highly leveraged restaurant 
firms are riskier in terms of their return on equity and investment. The results indicated that high 
leveraged firms were less risky in both market-based and accounting-based measures, which is 
the opposite of hypothesis two. Industry specific variables may help explain these unexpected 
findings. Lastly, for hypothesis three, the correlation between accounting-based measures and 
market-based measures was tested and found to be positively significant. The accounting-based 
profit measure, ROE in this study, and the market-based profit measure, stock price change 
percentage in this study, moved in the same direction. Moreover, the results showed that there 
were risk correlations between the two measures; when ROE fluctuated, so did the stock price 
change. 
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This study is not free from limitations. This study only used one independent variable, 
financial leverage, along with one covariate variable, firm size. Because there are various factors 
affecting firms’ profitability and level of debt use besides these variables, in order to more 
effectively investigate the relationship between firms’ level of debt use and their profitability and 
risk, inclusion of covariates besides the firm size is recommended for future study. Also, there 
are more than 878,000 restaurants in this country serving more than 70 billion meal and snack 
occasions (NRA, 2004). However, only 62 restaurant companies were included in this study 
because only a small number of restaurant firms are publicly traded. The restaurants used in this 
study are generally large, multi-unit companies. Most restaurant firms are not publicly traded but 
should be included to examine the true financial picture of the restaurant business. In addition, 
future studies should include more control variables related to both industry-specific variables, 
such as operating leverage and economy-related variables to create better models.        
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Table 1 
Descriptive Information of Variables 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Dependent variable      
ROEa 323 -76.2 38.37 8.80 11.72 
SPb 363 -11.35 14.04 0.79 4.09 
ROE stdc 320 0 22.70 1.88 2.71 
SP stdd 369 0 71.05 15.82 10.36 
Independent variable      
FLe 332 0 4.22 0.29 0.32 
Control variable      
TAf (million) 359 0.38 25525.10 802.20 2932.459 
Note: 1. The above numbers are before-transformation information 
          2. Transformation function      b. SP = (SP+12)1.02 
                      a. ROE = (ROE + 30)1.4                d. SP std= LN(SP std) 
                       c.ROE std = (ROE std)1.27    f. TA  = LN(TA) 
                      e. FL= (FL+1) -2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Regression Analysis results – Profitability (ROE and SP) 
 β 
Std. 
Error t-stat. p VIF 
F 
(sig.) 
R2 
(Adj R2) 
ROE      14.219 0.089 
  Intercept 104.820 17.007 6.163** .000  (.000) (.083) 
  FL 26.236 20.170 1.301 .194 1.000   
  TA 10.145 1.968 5.154** .000 1.000   
SP      2.526 0.016 
  Intercept 10.875 1.091 9.964** .000  (.082) (.009) 
  FL 2.206 1.280 1.723 .086 1.001   
  TA .188 .126 1.488 .138 1.001   
** p< .01 
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Table 3 
Regression Analysis results – Risk (ROE std and SP std) 
 β 
Std. 
Error t-stat. p VIF 
F 
(sig.) 
R2 
(Adj R2) 
        
ROE std      28.738 0.168 
   Intercept 1.735 .094 18.393** .000  (.000) (0.162) 
   FL -.616 .108 -5.687** .000 1.001   
   TA -.057 .011 -5.192** .000 1.001   
        SP std      31.212 0.162 
   Intercept 3.356 .125 26.748** .000  (.000) (0.157) 
   FL -.371 .147 -2.517* .012 1.001   
   TA -.109 .014 -7.575** .000 1.001     
Note: * p< .05, **p< .01   
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Pearson Correlation of variables (2-tailed) 
 
  ROE SP ROE std SP std FL TA 
ROE Pearson’s r 1.00 .14* -.16** -.22** .07 .24** 
 Sig.  . .01 .01 .00 .22 .00 
 N 322 318 292 321 295 320 
SP Pearson’s r .14* 1.00 -.13* .04 .10 .10 
 Sig.  .01 . .02 .51 .07 .07 
 N 318 363 316 362 325 351 
Pearson’s r -.16* -.13* 1.00 .25** -.30** -.28** ROE std 
Sig.  .01 .02 . .00 .00 .00 
 N 292 316 320 317 288 314 
SP std Pearson’s r -.22** .04 .25** 1.00 -.11* -.41** 
 Sig.  .00 .51 .00 . .05 .00 
 N 321 362 317 368 329 355 
FL Pearson’s r .07 .10 -.30** -.11* 1.00 -.03 
 Sig.  .22 .07 .00 .05  .61 
 N 295 325 288 329 332 329 
TA Pearson’s r .24** .10 -.28** -.41** -.03 1.00 
 Sig.  .00 .07 .00 .00 .61  
 N 320 351 314 355 329 359 
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* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
   
 
APPENDIX A.  
Companies included in data analysis 
Company Name Exchange Company Name Exchange 
Applebee's International, Inc.  NMSa Ark Restaurants Corp. NMS 
Back Yard Burgers, Inc. NASb Benihana Inc. NMS 
Bob Evans Farms, Inc. NMS Boston Restaurant Associates, Inc. OTCc 
Brinker International, Inc.  NYSd CBRL Group, Inc.  NMS 
CEC Entertainment, Inc. NYS Champion Sports, Inc. OTC 
Champps Entertainment,  Inc.  NMS Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc.  NMS 
Cheesecake Factory Inc. (The) NMS Chefs International, Inc. OTC 
Chicago Pizza & Brewery Inc.  NMS CKE Restaurants, Inc.  NYS 
Creative Host Services, Inc. NAS Darden Restaurants, Inc.  NYS 
Dave & Busters, Inc. NYS Denny's Corp  OTC 
Eat At Joes Ltd. OTC Elmer's Restaurants, Inc.  NAS 
ELXSI Corporation  NMS Empire Resorts Inc NAS 
Famous Dave's of America Inc. NMS Flanigan's Enterprises, Inc. ASEe 
Fresh Choice, Inc. NMS Friendly Ice Cream Corp  ASE 
Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. ASE Grill Concepts Inc. NAS 
J. Alexander's Corp ASE Jack in the Box, Inc.  NYS 
Landry's Restaurants, Inc. NYS Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. NMS 
Luby's, Inc.  NYS Main Street & Main, Inc. NMS 
Max & Erma's Restaurants, Inc.  NMS McDonald's Corp  NYS 
Mexican Restaurants, Inc. NAS Million Dollar Saloon Inc OTC 
Morgan's Foods, Inc. ASE Nathan's Famous, Inc.  NMS 
Nutrition Management Services Co. OTC O'Charley's Inc. NMS 
Outback Steakhouse, Inc. NYS Panera Bread Co.  NMS 
Papa John's International, Inc. NMS Quality Dining, Inc. NMS 
Rare Hospitality International, Inc. NMS Rick's Cabaret International Inc. NAS 
Ruby Tuesday, Inc. NYS Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc.  NMS 
Schlotzsky's, Inc. NMS Shells Seafood Restaurants Inc.  OTC 
Sonic Corp.  NMS Star Buffet, Inc.  NAS 
Steak n Shake Co. (The) NYS Total Entertainment Restaurant Corp. NMS 
Triarc Companies, Inc. NYS Wendy's International, Inc. NYS 
Worldwide Restaurant Concepts, Inc. NYS Yum! Brands, Inc.  NYS 
a. NMS = National Market System Stock Exchange  
b. NAS = NASDAQ Stock Exchange 
c. OTC = Over-The-Counter Stock Exchange 
d. NYS = New York Stock Exchange 
e. ASE =  American Stock Exchange 
 
